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Abstract
I extend the model-based literature on spillover effects of labour market reforms on
foreign (un-)employment by allowing for third-country effects. When the workhorse
two-country model is enlarged to include a third country, a reform causes an additional
indirect effect through a terms-of-trade shift between the foreign countries. To quantify
the increase or reduction in the overall spillover by means of this channel, simulations
based on empirically realistic scenarios are carried out. Thereby, the indirect effect
turns out to be too small to overturn the direct effect or to increase it considerably.
Differences in the reform spillover effects between foreign countries are mainly due to
differences in characteristics which influence the size of the direct impact.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical literature on spillover effects of labour market reforms on foreign (un-)employ-
ment builds on two-country model economies. Thus, it centers on the direct impact a country
has on its neighbour(s) by carrying out reforms. However, a domestic reform may also trigger
indirect effects abroad which occur through shifts between the affected foreign countries and,
hence, cannot be analysed in a two-country model. The scope and contribution of this study
is the analysis of the indirect effects in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with
three countries and labour market frictions.
To be more specific, a successful labour market reform in the domestic country results
in a relative abundance of domestic goods, implying a decrease in the terms of trade with
each of its neighbours. This terms-of-trade effect leads to a positive spillover effect, i.e. to
higher employment (and output) for the foreign economies, according to empirical evidence
and the majority of model-based studies.1 If the extent of the terms-of-trade decrease differs
among trading partners e.g. because of differing intensities of bilateral trade relations, then
the terms of trade between the trading partners themselves need to change as well. Thus,
the overall effect of a domestic reform incurred by a neighbouring country consists of the
sum of the direct effect generated by changes in the relation with the domestic country
and the indirect effect caused by shifts in the relation with other countries. If the foreign
country of interest experiences a stronger appreciation in its terms of trade with the domestic
country than other countries, it also appreciates with respect to the other countries. In
consequence, the aggregated spillover effect exceeds the direct effect. This aspect provides
a potential explanation for the puzzle raised by Felbermayr et al. (2012). They claim that
empirical evidence by Felbermayr et al. (2013) points to much higher spillovers than their
model simulations.2 However, if the relative prices of the other countries react stronger, the
country of interest needs to depreciate with respect to these countries, creating an opposing
effect. It cannot be ruled out a priori, that the indirect effect dominates the direct effect in
certain cases, leading to a negative overall spillover.
In this study, the relevant impact factors for the direction and strength of the indirect as
well as of the direct and overall effect are examined. The focus is not on the characteristics
of the reforming country which have been studied in the two-countries literature but on the
1Dao (2013a) and Felbermayr et al. (2013) investigate the spillover effects of labour market reforms
empirically, based on cross-country panel data. Dao (2013a) evaluates the effect of foreign unit labour costs
instrumented with statutory social security contribution rates on domestic employment. Felbermayr et al.
(2013) test the impact of domestic and foreign tax wedges on the domestic unemployment rate. Busl and
Seymen (2013) provide an overview of the model-based studies on international effects.
2Other model-based studies find spillover effects of a similar size as in Felbermayr et al. (2012), see Busl
and Seymen (2013).
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characteristics of its trading partners and in particular on differences between these countries
which provoke indirect effects. Of course, this study is not the first to include indirect effects
by modelling more than two countries. There are several studies based on medium to large
scale multi-country models, see e.g. Everaert and Schule (2008) or Gomes et al. (2012),
which analyse the (spillover) effects of labour or product market reforms. The scope of these
studies is, however, to evaluate the outcome of specific reform scenarios. Thus, they do not
address the composition of spillover effects including the relevance of indirect effects.3
The analysis is based on a standard international real business cycle model enhanced
by several labour market institutions and fiscal policy parameters. In particular, involun-
tary unemployment results from search and matching frictions in the labour market. Wages
are bargained between firms and workers and taxed on the employees’ and employers’ side.
Crucially for the subject of interest, the economy consists of three countries. International
spillovers occur through two channels in the model: international trade in intermediate goods
and international financial assets. The main part of the analysis deals with the long-run, i.e.
equilibrium, effects of a reform. Therefore, under the assumption that the current account
needs to be balanced in equilibrium, only the trade channel matters for the transmission.
Trade occurs as each country specialises in the production of its own good, whereas house-
holds consume a composite good, which is built up of the intermediate goods of all countries.
The three-country setup offers the possibility to appropriately model bilateral and overall
trade intensities simultaneously. This is not feasible in a two-country model, but important
for a quantitative evaluation because of their influence on the size of the spillover effect.
The financial channel matters when the dynamic response to a reform is explored in the last
section, to allow for short-term current account deficits or surpluses.
The reform scenario, for which I evaluate direct and indirect spillover effects, is a change
in the unemployment benefit scheme. To be specific, I consider a substantial reduction in
the unemployment benefit ratio, which is inspired by a German example from the recent
past, the so-called Hartz IV reform, and the related debate on the spillover and side effects
of such reforms. However, given that the only transmission mechanism in the long run in
the model is a change in terms of trade, the qualitative results of the study apply to all
kinds of reforms which affect the terms of trade and thus the price competitiveness between
countries.
I show that, similar to the results for the two-country scenario in Dao (2013a), a marginal
increase in the terms of trade with the reforming as well as with other neighbouring countries
triggers an increase in employment. The sign of the indirect effect depends on the direction
of the change in the terms of trade with other affected countries. This, in turn, depends—as
3Felbermayr et al. (2012) also work with a three-country model, but they only consider symmetric neigh-
bour countries. In consequence, a reform does not cause shifts between these countries.
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well as the size of the direct and indirect effect—on the differences in country characteristics.
Thus, I analyse the relevance of several country characteristics by simulating the reform for
varying values of the corresponding parameters on an empirically meaningful scale. The
baseline calibration is thereby orientated towards the European context and the German
reform scenario. I find that the relative openness and bilateral import preferences of countries
are of particular relevance for the size of the overall employment spillover and its components,
in conjunction with their size. The initial unemployment rate, the unemployment benefit
ratio, the capital share, the elasticity of matching, and the employee’s labour tax rate also
matter for the magnitude of the overall spillover. However, the size of the indirect effect
turns out to be very small in absolute terms. It is negligible vis-a`-vis the direct effect in most
simulations. In consequence, a negative indirect effect, which is e.g. obtained for relatively
small and open countries, does not dominate the positive direct effect. This implies that
the aggregated spillover is always positive. The relative size of the overall spillover effect,
measured as the ratio between the change of employment in the country of interest and
the reforming country, ranges between 0 and 11% for calibrations in an empirically realistic
interval. The upper range, which is measured for a very specific calibration with extreme
values, is therefore well above the average of 9%, estimated by Felbermayr et al. (2013) for
a sample of rich OECD countries. But for an average European country, the spillover turns
out to be well below at 1 to 2% (see Table 5).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, I describe the model details and
the baseline calibration of a symmetric three-country world. In Section 3, I briefly summarise
the effects triggered by a reform of the unemployment benefit ratio in a symmetrically
calibrated model. Subsequently, I explain the mechanism and composition of the direct and
indirect spillover effects. The theoretical exposition is followed by a simulation-based analysis
of the parameters driving the size and direction of the spillover components. Finally, Section
4 provides an exemplified analysis of the equilibrium effects and the dynamic responses to
the German reform for different European countries, namely France, Belgium and Austria.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model framework builds on a standard international real business cycle model enhanced
by search and matching frictions in the labour market, an international bond market and
fiscal policy parameters. The model economy consists of three countries which are allowed
to differ with respect to their size and their bilateral trade preferences. This property of the
model crystallises particularly in the trade relations between countries. As in the two-country
version, each country specialises in the production of an internationally traded intermediate
3
good. Following the preference patterns, the three intermediate goods are combined at the
national level to a non-traded final good which is used for consumption and investment
of households. This standard intra-industry trade framework maps the trade flows in the
European environment in an appropriate way. Shifts in the relative prices of intermediate
goods caused by a change in policy parameters are at the heart of the analysis of spillover
effects in the following section. Since the focus of the analysis is mainly on the long-run
implications of the model, I abstract from any price and wage rigidities.4
2.1 Households
Each country is inhabited by representative agents deriving utility from consumption.5 At
the beginning of each period, agents in each country i maximise their expected lifetime utility
without knowing whether they will end up unemployed or not:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [NitU(C
n
it) + (1−Nit)U(Cuit)] , (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and Cnit and C
u
it denote consumption in case of em-
ployment and unemployment, respectively. Per period utility is given by U(Ccit) = log (C
c
it).
With agents being risk averse and having access to complete income insurance markets, their
decisions exclusively depend on the aggregate probability of being employed Nit in country i
at period t. However, the decisions are made independent of their individual labour market
outcome.
The budget constraint of the representative household expressed in terms of the interme-
diate good produced in country i can be written as
(1 + τ ci )P
c
it [NitC
n
it + (1−Nit)Cuit] +Bit+1 + P citCAit =
= NitPitwit
(
1− τ di
)
+ (1−Nit)P citbi +Bit (1 + it) + Tit + Πit. (2)
Thereby, household income is composed of labour income wit, subject to taxes τ
d
i or unem-
ployment benefits bi, respectively, interest payments from bond holdings Bit(1 + it), gov-
ernment transfers Tit and firm profits Πit. Households spend their income on consumption,
including a consumption tax τ ci , on new bond holdings Bit+1, and on a portfolio adjustment
cost CAit defined as
CAit =
Φb
2
(
Bit+1
P cit
)2
(3)
4These features would greatly improve the match with international business cycle statistics, though, as
Patureau (2012) shows.
5To simplify the analytical analysis of spillover effects, employed persons are assumed to have no labour-
leisure choice but to work a fixed amount of time instead. Thus, adjustments in the labour market occur
only at the extensive margin.
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that is scaled by the factor Φb > 0.
6 In equation (2), P cit is the price of the local final good
while Pit represents the price of the local intermediate good. Note that the intermediate good
of the domestic country where the reform occurs, i.e. of country 1, is chosen as nume´raire,
hence P1t = 1. Finally, the law of motion of aggregate employment Nit is given by
Nit+1 = (1− si)Nit + φit(1−Nit), (4)
with si being the constant and exogenous job separation rate of employed workers and φit be-
ing the probability of finding a job when being unemployed. I define the number of successful
matches which result in hirings as Hit = φit(1−Nit) and the number of unemployed agents
as Uit = 1−Nit, which represents the unemployment rate, at the same time normalising the
potential workforce to unity.
Thus, the households’ optimisation decision problem is summarised by the Bellman equa-
tion
FHit = max
Cnit,C
u
it,Bit+1
[
NitU(C
n
it) + (1−Nit)U(Cuit) + βEt
(
FHit+1
)]
(5)
which is subject to the budget constraint (2) (with λit being the Lagrange multiplier) and
the law of motion of aggregate employment (4). The first order conditions with respect to
consumption and bond holdings are then given by:
U ′(Cnit) = U
′(Cuit) = (1 + τ
c
i )λitP
c
it (6)
λit
(
1 + Φb
Bit+1
P cit
)
= βEt [λit+1 (1 + it+1)] . (7)
Note that condition (6) implies that the optimal level of consumption does not depend on
the agents’ employment status, i.e. Ccit = C
n
it = C
u
it. This follows from the assumption of
complete income insurance markets.
2.2 Final Good Sector
In each of the three countries there is a competitive final good sector, which produces a
non-tradable final good Dcit used for consumption and investment. I follow Kose and Yi
(2006) in using the standard Armington aggregator to describe the composition of the final
good in terms of the three intermediate goods
Dcit =
[
κ
1
η
iiy
η−1
η
iit + κ
1
η
jiy
η−1
η
jit + κ
1
η
kiy
η−1
η
kit
] η
η−1
, (8)
where η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. yjit denotes the
quantity of intermediate input in the final good production of country i = 1, 2, 3 stemming
6The adjustment cost guarantees the stationarity of the model in the light of its incomplete financial
market as discussed in detail by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
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from country j = 1, 2, 3. 0 < κji < 1 is the preference of consumers in country i for products
from country j and in particular κii represents the preference for domestic goods in domestic
spending, the so called home bias. I will refer to κji as import or openness preference in the
following.
The demand functions for intermediate goods used in country i are derived by maximising
the profits of final good producers P citD
c
it − Pityiit − Pjtyjit − Pktykit:
yiit = κii
(
P cit
Pit
)η
Dcit (9)
yjit = κji
(
P cit
Pjt
)η
Dcit (10)
ykit = κki
(
P cit
Pkt
)η
Dcit, (11)
where P cit/Pit represents the price of the final good in country i in terms of the inter-
mediate good produced in the same country. I define the terms of trade of country i with
any country j as the relation of its import to export prices, i.e. TOT ijt =
Pjt
Pit
. Taking the
intermediate good demand functions and equation (8) together, the price relation P cit/Pit of
country i results to be a combination of the terms of trade with its trading partners j and
k:
P cit
Pit
=
[
κii + κji
(
TOT ijt
)η−1
+ κki
(
TOT ikt
)η−1] 11−η
(12)
2.3 Intermediate Good Sector
The intermediate good sector in each country consists of a continuum of firms who operate
in a perfectly competitive market. Their Cobb-Douglas production function using domestic
labour Lit and capital Kit as input reads as follows:
Yit = AiK
α
itN
1−α
it , (13)
where 0 < 1 − α < 1 is the labour share of income. The level of technology Ai is kept
constant as it is of no relevance for analysing the impact of political changes.
The profit of intermediate good firms Πit is given by
Πit = PitYit −NitPitwit
(
1 + τ fi
)
− P citIcit − ωiP citVit − P citCIit (14)
where, on the cost side, the firm faces wage bills, hiring costs and investment adjustment
costs. Labour costs include a payroll tax τ fi . Firms need to hire each period to adjust the
size of the workforce which shrinks due to exogenous job separation. For each vacant job
posted they incur a cost ωi > 0. The total number of posted vacancies is Vit. With qit being
the probability of finding an appropriate match, the number of successful matches in the
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labour market leading to hirings Hit can be expressed as qitVit. Hence, we can rewrite the
law of motion of aggregate employment in terms of vacancies Vit as
Nit+1 = (1− si)Nit + qitVit. (15)
The costs of adjusting a firms capital stock CIit are given by
CIit =
ΦI
2
(Kit+1 −Kit)2
Kit
, (16)
where ΦI > 0 is a scaling parameter. The law of motion for capital Kit follows
Kit+1 = (1− δ)Kit + Icit. (17)
Firms’ intertemporal optimisation problem with respect to capital and labour can be
summarised as
F Fit = max
Kit,Nit
[
ΠFit + βEt
(
λit+1
λit
F Fit+1
)]
(18)
subject to the production technology (13), the law of motion of capital (17) and aggre-
gate employment (15).7 If we define the shadow price of capital qTit = 1 + ΦI
Icit−δKit
Kit
and
zit =
Pit
P cit
(1− α) Yit
Nit
, the optimality conditions are given by
qTit = βEt
[
P cit+1λit+1
P citλit
{
Pit+1
1
P cit+1
α
Yit+1
Kit+1
+ qTit+1 − δ +
ΦI
2
(
Iit+1 − δKit+1
Kit+1
)2}]
(19)
ωi
qit
= βEt
[
P cit+1λit+1
P citλit
{
zit+1 − Pit+1
P cit+1
wit+1
(
1 + τ fi
)
+ (1− si) ωi
qit+1
}]
. (20)
2.4 Matching and Bargaining in the Labour Market
The technology of hiring by matching vacancies and unemployed persons follows Pissarides
(2000)
Hit = χiV
ψ
it (1−Nit)1−ψ , (21)
where χi > 0 is a parameter that measures the efficiency of the matching process and
0 < ψ < 1 denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the vacancies.
Each period, firms and workers bargain over wages wit within a Nash bargaining framework.
The outcome can be calculated by maximising the weighted marginal value of an additional
employed in terms of utility for firms and households:
max
wit
(
λit
∂F Fit
∂Nit
)(
∂FHit
∂Nit
)1−
(22)
7The ratio of the future to the present Lagrange multiplier λit+1/λit of household’s budget constraint is
used to weigh firms’ future profit flows, since households are the owners of the firms.
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where 0 <  < 1 measures the bargaining power of the firm. For the household the marginal
value of a match is given by
∂FH1t
∂Nit
= λit(Pitwit(1− τ di )− P citbi) + (1− si − φit)βEt
[
∂FHit+1
∂Nit+1
]
. (23)
For firms, the value of an additional worker (in terms of the final good) can be written as
∂F Fit
∂Nit
= Pit(1− α) Yit
Nit
− (1 + τ fi )Pitwit + (1− si)βEt
[
λit+1
λit
∂F Fit+1
∂Nit+1
]
. (24)
Defining labour market tightness θit =
Vit
Uit
, optimal labour contracts according to equation
(22) imply
wit =
1− 
1 + τ fi
[
ωi
P cit
Pit
θit + (1− α) Yit
Nit
]
+

1− τ di
P cit
Pit
bi. (25)
2.5 The Government
The government collects income from its taxes on consumption and labour on the one side,
which is spent on benefits for the unemployed and transfer payments on the other side. The
government budget constraint then reads as follows
τ ci P
c
itC
c
it +
(
τ di + τ
f
i
)
PitNitwit = Tit + (1−Nit)P citbi. (26)
2.6 Equilibrium
Global equilibrium requires market clearing in all goods and financial markets. The condi-
tions given below highlight how the three countries in the model are linked to each other.
In the markets of intermediate goods, the equilibrium is given by
pi1Y1t = pi1y11t + pi2y12t + pi3y13t (27)
pi2Y2t = pi1y21t + pi2y22t + pi3y23t (28)
pi3Y3t = pi1y31t + pi2y32t + pi3y33t, (29)
where pii is the number of households in country i, thus determining the size of the country.
The total number of households in the world is normalised to 1, which implies
3∑
i=1
pii = 1.
Market clearing in the final good markets is obtained if for all countries i = 1, 2, 3 holds
Dcit = C
c
it + I
c
it + ωiVit + CIit + CAit. (30)
Finally, for the international bond market the equilibrium is defined as
pi1B1t+1 + pi2B2t+1 + pi3B3t+1 = 0. (31)
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The trade balance of country i then can be written as TBit = PitYit − P citDcit, which has to
be equal to the balance of payments Bit+1 − (1 + it)Bit in equilibrium.
The model is solved by log-linearising the equation system around the deterministic
steady state and applying the Newton-Raphson algorithm as implemented in DYNARE for
deterministic models.
2.7 Baseline Calibration of Symmetric Countries
In my basic setup, I calibrate all three countries symmetrically to match quarterly German
data. The parameter values of the baseline scenario are summarised in Table 1. I set the
elasticity of substitution for capital α in the production function to 0.34, in line with German
data for the past decade. In accordance with the literature, the steady state value of the
capital depreciation rate δ is chosen to be 0.025. The discount rate of households is assumed
to be β = 0.99, which according to equation (7) corresponds to an annual real interest rate
in the steady state of about 4%. I choose  = 0.5 in line with other studies on labour
market rigidities in Europe (see e.g. Dao, 2013b or Faia et al., 2013), which implies that
the bargaining power in the Nash-bargaining is equally split between firms and workers. In
keeping with the estimates of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), the elasticity of vacancies in
the matching function ψ is likewise set to 0.5. The probability of filling a vacancy q is set
to 0.7 which is at the lower bound of values used in the literature and therefore seems to be
adequate for Germany and Europe.
In my baseline calibration, several parameters and steady state values of variables con-
cerning the labour market are matched to German data from 2003, before the labour market
reforms were introduced.8 The steady state unemployment rate is set to 1−N = 0.098 based
on the annual harmonised unemployment rates from the OECD Reference Series. The steady
state (un-)employment level together with the steady state output-capital ratio, derived from
equation (19), give intermediate goods output and capital levels. The job finding probability
φ is computed as the inverse of the average unemployment duration which, according to the
German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit), amounted to 9.53 month
in 2003. The labour market tightness in the steady state is derived from the relationship
θ = q/φ. The job separation rate results from the steady state condition s = φ(1 − N)/N
obtained from equation (4) yielding s = 0.034, which is in accordance with empirical esti-
mates (see Hobijn and S¸ahin, 2009, Gartner et al., 2012 or Kohlbrecher et al., 2013). Based
on the steady state relationships in the labour market and the preceding calibration, the
parameter for the matching efficiency χ can be calculated.
8While the Hartz IV reform only became effective in 2005, it was preceded by three reform laws concerning
other aspects of the labour market coming into force in 2003 and 2004.
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Table 1: Calibrated and Implied Parameter and Steady State Values
1−N Unemployment rate 0.098 b/w Unemployment benefit r. 0.32
φ Job finding probability 0.32 τ f Employers’ labour tax 0.17
q Vacancy filling probability 0.70 τ d Employees’ labour tax 0.17
ψ Elasticity of vacancies 0.50 τ c Consumption tax 0.16
 Bargaining power firms 0.50 β Depreciation rate 0.99
α Capital share 0.34 η Elast. of substitution
δ Discount factor 0.025 btw. intermediate goods 1.5
ΦI Scal. invest. adj. costs 7 κii Home bias 0.7
Φb/NX Scal. portfolio adj. costs 0.0038 κji Bil. import preference 0.15
s Job separation rate 0.034 χ Matching efficiency 0.47
ω Vacancy posting cost 2.37 θ Labour market tightness 0.45
pi Country size 1/3
Sources: OECD Reference Series, Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, OECD Labour Market Statistics,
OECD Benefits and Wages: Statistics, OECD Taxing Wages 2003, OECD Taxing Wages 2010,
OECD Recent Tax Policy Trends and Reforms in OECD Countries, OECD Consumption Tax
Trends 2012.
The steady state value of the unemployment benefit ratio b/w is set equal to the gross
replacement rate (GRR) from the OECD Benefits and Wages: Statistics in 2003 in order to
obtain b.9 I use data from several OECD publications (see Table 1) to calibrate employers’
and employees’ tax rates on wages (τ f , τ d) as well as the consumption tax rate τ c. Given
these parameters and the deterministic steady state of equations (20) and (25), the real
vacancy posting cost ω can be computed.
The elasticity of internationally traded goods η is set to 1.5 as originally proposed by
Backus et al. (1992). Central to the size of spillovers is the calibration of the Armington
aggregator weights κij, as the following analysis shows. The parameter defining the home bias
of consumed products κii is set so that the implied steady state import-to-GDP ratio matches
the average import share observed in Germany vis-a`-vis the world since the introduction of
the euro, which corresponds to setting 1−κii = 0.3.10 For simplicity, I assume that bilateral
import preferences are all symmetric in the baseline scenario, i.e. κji = 0.15 for i, j = 1, 2, 3
and i 6= j.
9The GRR data consist of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance benefits and do not
take tax and social security contributions on earnings and benefits into account. Furthermore, the GRR
data are based on three different household types. They are a weighted average of the payments over the
first five years of unemployment with the first year being weighted more heavily.
10Intermediate good prices are normalised to one in the deterministic steady state.
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For a given output level, the openness preference parameters κii and κji and the elasticity
η determine the demand for intermediate goods. The country sizes pii are then given by
means of equations (27)-(29), summarising the intermediate goods market equilibrium and
the normalisation of the world size to one. Of course, in the symmetric baseline scenario all
countries are of the same size, i.e. pii = 1/3. The relation between the openness preferences
and the country sizes implies that a country is the bigger, the larger its home bias κii relative
to the other countries. In contrast, more open countries are smaller. For the three-country
case, asymmetries in bilateral preferences influence country sizes as well. The more a country
imports from one country relative to another, the bigger is the first country in comparison to
the second. The calibration strategy furthermore implies that the country size is influenced
by the relative employment of a country. How the country size depends on the import
preferences and employment of countries and how it varies if preferences of one country
differ from the baseline case, is illustrated in Appendix A.
Following Patureau (2007), the scaling factor of capital adjustment costs is set to ΦI = 7,
reflecting the volatility of investment (relative to output) in the G7 countries. By setting the
ratio of the scaling parameter for portfolio adjustment of households and the steady state
exports to Φb/NX = 0.0038, as reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), the scaling
parameter Φb can be calculated.
3 Spillover Effects in a Three-Country Model
The underlying reform scenario in the next subsections consists in a considerable cutback of
the unemployment benefits. It is based on the German example of a reform in 2005 called
“Hartz IV” which reduced the average unemployment benefit ratio by about 10 percentage
points from originally 32 % (see Table 1). In the following the analysis, I focus on the steady
state effects of the reform and discuss the factors influencing the direction and strength of
spillovers to other countries. As short-run consequences may differ strongly from the long-
run effects and are of great importance to get political support for reforms, the dynamic
effects are discussed based on an example in the next section.
To start with, I briefly describe the effects of a reduction in unemployment benefits in the
baseline setup, i.e. with countries which are all identically calibrated and therefore perfectly
symmetric. This specification implies that no indirect effects take place as no shift in relative
terms occurs between foreign countries, being all affected to the same extent. In the following
subsections, I deviate from the baseline calibration. I analyse how asymmetry in various
country characteristics influences the direct spillover effects from the reforming country and
triggers indirect effects through a third country. First, I concentrate on asymmetries in the
import preferences and the related country sizes. In the consequent experiments, the effect
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of variations in other parameters is analysed.
Notice that I select a specific type of reform here, namely a reduction in unemployment
benefits. However, the main and only channel in the long run through which spillovers to
other countries occur in the model is through changes in the terms of trade between countries.
So, as long as a reform of labour market institutions or of fiscal institutions spurs production
and decreases domestic relative to foreign prices, spillovers are qualitatively comparable and
influenced by very similar factors. In this vein, the following findings may be interpreted in
a more general sense.
3.1 Domestic and Foreign Effects in a Symmetric World
By assuming that all trading partners of the reforming country (labelled country 1) are
identical, we obtain a scenario which resembles a two-country world since shifts in the relative
prices between foreign countries do not occur. The domestic and foreign effects caused by
the reform in the unemployment benefit ratio are only briefly summarised in the following.
A more detailed description of reform effects in comparable two-country models is given in
Busl and Seymen (2013) or in Dao (2013a).
Domestic Effects A reduction of unemployment benefits in country 1 decreases the out-
side option of workers in the bargaining process with firms and therefore lowers the negotiated
wage rates. This boosts labour demand causing firms to post more vacancies and ultimately
employment and output to rise. A higher supply of intermediate goods produced in country
1 leads to a drop in relative prices, inducing a positive income effect on domestic as well
as foreign households. This effect is opposed by income losses of domestic households due
to the cut in unemployment benefits and wages. On impact, the second effects dominates,
even though firm profits and transfers increase, and consumption and investment in coun-
try 1 fall. Investment recovers immediately at the expense of deferred consumption which
increases slowly afterwards when hirings become effective, the capital stock grows and firm
profits increase. Whether the long-run effect on consumption is positive and how big it is,
depends on the international environment as the analysis of the openness preferences at the
end of this subsection reveals.
Spillover Effects As the prices in the reforming country drop, the terms of trade of its
trading partners (defined as export/import prices) improve. In this subsection, I assume that
all trading partners are perfectly symmetric. This implies that the terms of trade change
for all foreign countries by the same amount and relative prices, i.e. terms of trade, between
these countries do not change. Therefore, all foreign countries are subject to the same direct
12
effects stemming from the price changes in country 1 described in the following. However,
relative quantities between these countries are not affected by the reform.
The higher evaluation of goods produced in foreign countries increases the surplus from
production there to be shared between foreign workers and firms through Nash bargaining.
In consequence, wages and output as well as employment rise in the foreign countries. The
fall in prices in country 1 as well as higher wages and a lower share of unemployed in the
foreign countries induce households there to consume more. The quantitative evaluation
of the model below shows that while the effects on output and consumption can be quite
pronounced, the response of foreign employment is on average about two orders of magnitude
smaller than in country 1.
Impact of Characteristics of the Domestic Country To conclude this subsection, I
briefly describe the most important characteristics of country 1, determining its relations
with the international environment and driving the strength of domestic and foreign effects
while sticking to the assumption that its trading partners are all identical.
• Openness preference of the domestic country (1 − κ11) relative to foreign countries
(1− κ22 = 1− κ33):
The influence of openness and size of the reforming country has already been discussed
in previous studies (see Felbermayr et al., 2012). In the present model, the size of a
country is strongly linked to its relative openness (see discussion in Subsection 2.7).
The size of country 1 decreases with its openness relative to its neighbours. As in
Felbermayr et al. (2012) and Felbermayr et al. (2013), the openness and size of the
reforming country play a role for the strength of effects at home and abroad. The
more open country 1, the smaller the domestic and foreign effects on employment,
although the response of foreign employment to the home bias in country 1 is minor.
In contrast, if foreign countries are more open, the domestic and foreign effects on
employment are strengthened, but the change in the domestic response is minimal.
This finding is in line with the empirical results of Dao (2013a), according to which
the degree of openness of the domestic country has no impact on the spillover size. It
also matches the results of Felbermayr et al. (2013). They find in their model as well
as in their empirical analysis that spillovers to more open/central economies (which
are characterised by lower trade costs in their model) and to smaller economies are
stronger. Figure 1 summarises the growth rates of domestic and foreign employment
after the reform for varying overall openness preferences 1−κii. The preferences of the
domestic as well as of the foreign countries are allowed to assume values between 0.01
and 0.5, that is from a very small steady state import share of 1% to a share of 50%
as e.g. observed in Belgium w.r.t. the other euro area members since the introduction
13
Notes: In this scenario foreign countries are identical. They differ from the domestic country
only with respect to their home bias κii.
Figure 1: Percentage Change in Employment after a Reduction in b1 as a Function of 1−κ11
and 1− κ22 = 1− κ33
of the euro. If both foreign countries are very open, the spillover effect amounts to
about 1.6% of the domestic effect, whereas the effect approaches zero for very closed
countries. The same relation is observed for output and consumption (not shown), but
for the latter changes in response to the countries own preference for openness are much
more pronounced. The size of the output (consumption) spillover ranges from about
0.2% (1%) of the domestic effect for relatively closed countries to over 9% (300%) for
very open countries.
• Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods η:
This parameter influences the reform effects at home and abroad. The lower η, the
stronger is the adjustment in the composition of the final good after an exogenous
shock. A greater change in the relative quantities of intermediate goods used to pro-
duce the final good implies a more pronounced change in the terms of trade. Therefore,
the lower η, the stronger is the increase in output, consumption and employment abroad
in the long run, whereas domestic effects are dampened. If country 1 is very open, i.e.
there is a high preference for foreign intermediate goods, and the elasticity of substi-
tution η between foreign and domestic goods is low, effects on domestic consumption
can even be negative.11 This result is of great relevance for the political feasibility of
such a reform in small and very open countries. It also points to the fact that it is
very important to model the trade preferences of a reforming country adequately to
correctly evaluate reform effects. Unfortunately, the appropriate value for η is hard to
11Setting e.g. η = 1 and 1− κ11 ≥ 0.4 leads to such effects in the model.
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pick as there is no observable empirical counterpart available and Hooper et al. (2000),
who estimate the income and price elasticities of exports and imports in the G7 on
data until 1994, find it to lie in a broad range between 0.8 and 2.3.
3.2 Direct and Indirect Effects in an Asymmetric World
What drives the size of spillovers to employment in the foreign countries, taking the char-
acteristics of the reforming country as given? And how do differences in the characteristics
of the foreign countries affect the spillover? As described above, in the long run, changes in
the terms of trade are the only channel creating an impact on foreign economic outcomes in
the model.
Direct Effect As long as all foreign countries are identical, the equilibrium effect stems
solely from terms-of-trade changes with the country where reforms occur. This effect is
labelled direct effect in the following. The size of the direct effect depends on the strength
of the terms-of-trade change and the elasticity of foreign outcomes—I focus on employment
in the following—w.r.t. this terms of trade. As shown in detail in Appendix C, one can
derive the elasticity of employment in the foreign country of interest (which I call country 2
from now on) w.r.t. the terms of trade between this country and country 1 in steady state,
N2,TOT 21 , which is given by the following formula:
N2,TOT 21 =
κ12
ω2
s2ψ(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
) 
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
[
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
] > 0 (32)
First, notice that this elasticity is always positive, which is in line with Dao (2013a)’s
finding. She proofed that in a two-country world with labour market frictions, an increase
in terms of trade for the foreign country always leads to a positive reaction of employment
in that country. According to expression (32), import preferences towards country 1 κ12 and
firms bargaining power  have a positive impact on the elasticity. In contrast, the vacancy
posting cost ω2 and initial labour market tightness θ2 decrease the response of employment
to changes in terms of trade. A higher matching efficiency χ2 and job survival rate 1 − s2
increase the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to terms of trade θ2,TOT 21 ,
whereas their impact on N2,TOT 21 is ambiguous.
While the elasticity of employment w.r.t. a country’s terms of trade can be pinned
down analytically and its sign and driving factors can be derived unambiguously, the same
cannot be said of the change in terms of trade caused by a reform, i.e. there is no analytical
expression describing which parameters are relevant and how they impact the change in terms
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of trade after a reform. Therefore, I defer the analysis of the factors influencing the resulting
change in the terms of trade to the empirical quantification in the consequent subsections.
Indirect Effect If the foreign countries are not identical, the size of the marginal impact
of terms of trade changes may differ between country 2 and 3, i.e. N2,TOT 21 6= N3,TOT 31 .
Furthermore, the extent of the depreciation of country 1’s terms of trade with different
trading partners may vary, i.e. ∆TOT 21 6= ∆TOT 31 . In this case, a contemporaneous shift in
the terms of trade between the foreign countries, TOT 23 , occurs, which induces an additional
indirect effect on N2. The size and sign of the indirect effect on N2 depends on the size
and sign of the change in TOT 23 and of the elasticity of employment in country 2 w.r.t. to
TOT 23 , N2,TOT 23 . This elasticity differs from equation (32) only in the import preference
parameter in the nominator, where we have κ32 instead of κ12 (see Appendix C). Hence it is
always positive as well. If country 2 has identical preferences for intermediates from country
1 and 3, i.e. κ12 = κ32, a marginal change in the terms of trade with one of these countries
has exactly the same effect on employment in country 2. While we know that country 2’s
terms of trade with country 1 always improve after the reform, thus yielding a positive direct
spillover effect concerning employment, the same does not necessarily hold true for its terms
of trade with country 3. These terms of trade appreciate if the relative prices of country
2 increase to a greater extent than the relative prices of country 3, otherwise they fall. In
consequence, whether the indirect effect on employment in country 2 is positive or negative,
depends on its relative change in terms of trade.
Overall Spillover An approximation of the total effect on N2 around the initial steady
state i.e. taking the elasticity as constant, can be written as
∆N2 ≈ N2,TOT 21 ∗∆TOT 21︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ N2,TOT 23 ∗∆TOT 23︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
(33)
where ∆x is the growth rate of x.12 Based on equation (33), the total effect can be decom-
posed and the relevance of differences in country characteristics on the components of ∆N2
can be separated. The key question is then which country characteristics induce a dampened
spillover effect by creating a negative indirect effect, i.e. a decrease in TOT 23 and which en-
hance the spillover through a positive indirect effect. Furthermore, it is of interest how the
relevant characteristics for the size and sign of the indirect effect impact on the direct effect.
And finally, what are the quantitative implications for the overall spillover effect? How large
or small can the spillover become and can the indirect effect possibly dominate the direct
effect, turning the aggregated effect negative?
12It turns out that the approximation is relative precise in the following evaluations. I find all approximated
values to be less than 1% above the true change in N2.
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Simulation Procedure In the next subsections, I describe the impact of several country
characteristics within their empirically relevant range on ∆N2. I proceed by updating the
value of the selected parameter in the initial calibration of the model following the approach
described in Subsection 2.7. Then, the effect of the reform for the newly calibrated model is
calculated. This method entails that the implied parameter values, namely the job separation
rate s, the matching efficiency χ and the vacancy posting costs ω, may adjust accordingly,
especially when labour market related characteristics are subject of the analysis. The same
applies for the country size when import preferences are varied. Alternatively, one could fix
these parameters to their values in the baseline calibration and let the initial steady state
values of unemployment, the job finding probability and the vacancy filling probability ad-
just. The drawback of this approach is that the resulting effects on employment between the
single calibrations are not comparable anymore as the initial steady state (un-)employment
level may differ. Therefore, I stick to the initial calibration assumptions.13
The results of the simulations are summarised in Table 2. The starting point is a detailed
analysis of the importance of the openness and import preferences of the foreign countries.
As these preferences have strong influence on the sign and size of the indirect effect and
also on the size of the direct effect, I choose to tailor the consequent experiments to a more
specific context. This consists of an open and sizeable reforming country, a small and very
open country, for which I study the spillover effects, and a big rest of the world country
with a strong home bias (trade within this aggregate is not of relevance). This scenario is
far from the baseline case with identical import preferences and country sizes but is more
suitable to answer applied questions about the drivers of spillover effects from one country
to another, including third-country effects stemming from interaction with the rest of the
world. One example is the analysis of the spillover effects of the German Hartz reforms
to its neighbours in the European context, to which I refer in Section 4. The possibility
to analyse such a scenario distinguishes the three-country model from the standard two-
country models tailored for two large countries as well as from small open economy models.
As such, the framework would also be suitable to analyse the implications of various reform
scenarios discussed in Europe at the moment which need to be evaluated ex-ante as well as
ex-post. Therefore, I investigate the impact of further country characteristics based on this
asymmetric country constellation in the subsequent section.
3.3 Trade Openness
All asymmetries between country 2 and 3—whether in country 1’s preferences for goods from
country 2 and 3 or in their own import preference parameters—have an impact on ∆TOT 23 .
13In addition, test simulations with this alternative calibration reveal that results do not differ fundamen-
tally.
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Notes: In this scenario 1− κ11 = 0.3. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , increase linear
with growing openness 1− κ22 = κ12 + κ32.
Figure 2: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects with Varying Degrees of
Openness in Country 2 and 3
In other words, as long as country 1 has identical preferences for intermediates from country
2 and 3 (κ12 = κ13), the trade relation between country 2 and 3 is symmetric (κ23 = κ32),
and these countries have symmetric preferences for the intermediate of country 1 (κ21 = κ31),
there is no indirect effect, given the non-openness related parameters are symmetric as well.
In the following, I relax these symmetries stepwise to analyse their implications. As equation
(32) shows, the marginal effect of a change in terms of trade with country 1 for employment in
a country i is characterised by a large set of parameters as well as initial steady state values.
If we assume all these parameters and initial conditions to be equal between countries in
the following, with the exception of the import preferences κij, then initial unemployment,
labour-capital ratio and production have also to be equal.
First, the impact of overall openness of country 2 (1 − κ22) and country 3 (1 − κ33) on
the employment spillover to country 2 is analysed. While retaining the openness of country
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1 as in the baseline calibration, i.e. 1 − κ11 = 0.3, the preferences of country 2 and 3 take
values between 0.01 and 0.5 as in Subsection 3.1. Thereby, the bilateral import preferences
of each country are kept symmetric, hence κki = κji = (1 − κii)/2. In Figure 2 the upper
two panels show the change of the terms of trade of country 2 with country 1 and 3 due to
the reduction in unemployment benefits b1 as a function of 1 − κ22 and 1 − κ33. The lower
panels of Figure 2 show the changes in N2 separated in the direct and the indirect effect.
Recall that the model assumptions imply open countries to be smaller (in terms of output)
than relatively closed economies. ∆TOT 21 decreases with increasing openness of country 2.
The direct effect, in contrast, increases with (1− κ22) as the rise in the elasticity due to the
increasing openness dominates the terms-of-trade changes. The panels on the right hand side
demonstrate the importance of the relative openness and country size between country 2 and
3 for the direction of ∆TOT 23 and the indirect effect. For 1 − κ22 > 1 − κ33, which implies
pi2 < pi3, the reform yields a stronger rise of TOT
3
1 than of TOT
2
1 and therefore triggers a
depreciation of TOT 23 and in consequence a negative indirect effect. The opposite applies if
country 2 is more open and bigger than country 3. Independent of the relatively openness,
the absolute change in TOT 23 is relatively small compared to TOT
2
1 . The same applies to the
indirect effect compared to the direct effect. It reaches at most 1.75% of the direct effect.
Thus, the aggregated effect is very similar to the direct effect. The size of the employment
spillover measured relative to the effect in the domestic economy, i.e. ∆N2/∆N1, ranges
between close to 0% for very high κ22 and 1.6% for a very open country 2 whose import
share adds up to about 50% of output.
In the second step, the overall openness of country 3 is fixed to 1−κ33 = 0.1 as from now
on country 3 is regarded as the large rest-of-the-world aggregate consistent with the empirical
questions of interest. Figure 3 sheds light on the importance of the import preferences of
country 2, κ12 and κ32, which determine κ22 = 1 − κ12 − κ32. Remember that N2,TOT 21
increases in κ12 and N2,TOT 23 in κ32. This explains why the direct effect mainly depends on
κ12 and rises with higher values of κ12, whereas ∆TOT
2
1 decreases in κ12 and increases in
κ32. The indirect effect is most relevant for very small κ12 and relatively high κ32, where
it becomes several times as large as the direct effect. In contrast, it is negligible for a high
import preference towards country 1 as it is dominated by a strong direct effect of close to
3%. Nevertheless, the absolute size of indirect effects is very small in all scenarios with a
maximum value of 0.002%. The range of ∆N2/∆N1 extends from close to zero for a very
closed country 2, i.e. very small κ12 and κ32, to about 2.9% for small κ22 (see Table 2).
Finally, I also fix 1− κ22 = 0.5, which implies that country 2 represents a country which
is more open and smaller than the reforming country. In Figure 4 the import shares of
country 1 and 3 from country 2 float up to half of their overall openness while κ13 and
κ31 adjust accordingly. The lower the import preference of country 3, κ23, the higher the
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Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3 and 1−κ33 = 0.1. N2,TOT 21 increases linear with growing
κ12, while N2,TOT 23 increase linear with growing κ32.
Figure 3: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying κ12 and κ32
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5. Both elasticities,
N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , are constant in κ21 and κ23.
Figure 4: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying κ21 and κ23
direct and indirect effect. The higher the import preference of country 1, κ21, the higher
are both effects. In contrast to the other import preference parameters analysed before,
κ21 and κ23 influence the direct and the indirect effect in the same direction. Hence, high
direct effects are strengthened by the indirect effect, whereas low values of the direct effect
are additionally reduced by the indirect effect. The variation in size of the direct effect
relative to ∆N1 ranges from 1.45% to 1.74%. The indirect effect is still small in comparison,
amounting at the utmost to 15% of the direct effect and varying between -0.21% and 0.21%
of ∆N1. Since ∆N1 is lowest for high κ21 and low κ23, the relative spillover size ∆N2/∆N1
reaches with 1.94% its highest values for this constellation. For weak import preferences
of country 1 towards country 2 and strong preferences of country 3, the relative size of the
effect goes down to 1.24%.
Summarising the results of this subsection, import preferences in conjunction with the
country size have a strong impact on the relative and absolute size of spillover effects. Very
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open countries having a strong trade relation with the reforming country are likely to be
subject to the strongest spillovers. While the direct effects range between close to zero and
3% of the domestic effect, the indirect effects, whether they are positive or negative, are
three to four orders of magnitude smaller than the domestics effect. In addition, the import
preference parameters having the strongest impact on the size of direct and indirect effects,
κ12 and κ32, show an opposing impact on direct and indirect effects. Thus, the strongest
direct effect is dampened by a negative indirect effect, whereas the weakest direct effect is
strengthened by a relatively high positive indirect effect. As a result, negative indirect effects
never overturn the direct effect, which yields a positive overall effect in all cases.
3.4 Further Country Characteristics
In the following, the impact of further characteristics of the foreign countries are discussed
which are of relevance for the labour market outcome there. Equation (32) suggests that
there are many parameters and initial conditions which could potentially have an impact
on the direct and indirect spillover effect. I explore these characteristics separately, based
on the previously introduced scenario with a small open second country (κ22 = 0.5), and
a big and less open third country (κ33 = 0.1) representing the rest-of-the-world aggregate.
The bilateral import preferences are assumed to be symmetric, i.e. κji = κki. This entails
pi1 = 0.22, pi2 = 0.13 and pi3 = 0.65 everything else being symmetric as in the baseline
calibration. Furthermore, the scenario implies that the indirect effect stemming from the
reform is negative and amounts to a decrease in N2 of 0.191 per mill (cf. Figure 2). While
I check for the impact of characteristics of country 2 as well as of country 3 since both may
be at the root of asymmetries, in the lower part of Table 2 only those of country 2 are
summarised. This choice is based on the fact, that changes in the calibration of country 3
have in quantitative terms only a very limited or no influence at all on the size of employment
spillovers to country 2. Detailed figures of the simulation results are provided in Appendix
B. In the following, I discuss the consequence of differences in the country characteristics
with a focus on those having a quantitative relevant impact.
• Unemployment benefit ratio b/w:
A higher level of unemployment benefits in country 2 strengthens the direct spillover
effect to employment by increasing the elasticity of employment in response to the
change in terms of trade with country 1 N2,TOT 21 .
14 Since N2,TOT 23 rises as well, it
contemporaneously leads to a stronger negative indirect effect, thus opposing the direct
effect. Nevertheless, the aggregated effect is stronger for higher b2/w2 as indirect effects
14A higher unemployment benefit ratio implies a lower cost of vacancy posting for a given level of unem-
ployment in a country.
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only play a minimal role. For a generous unemployment benefit ratio of 40% in country
2, the relative size of the spillover ∆N2/∆N1 amounts to 2.32%. Unsurprisingly, the
unemployment benefit ratio of country 3 has only a slight impact on ∆TOT 23 but none
on ∆TOT 21 as Figure 7 in Appendix B illustrates.
• Pre-reform steady state unemployment level U :
Similar to the unemployment benefit ratio, the unemployment rate in country 3 has
only a minor impact on ∆TOT 23 and the indirect effect (see Figure 8). In contrast, a
very high initial unemployment rate in country 2 of about 20% yields a strong change
in employment with a direct effect of over 0.036%, a negative indirect effect of -0.002%
and a high relative overall effect above 4%. This increase is on the one hand driven
by level effects. Higher unemployment in the model is equivalent to a lower number
of employed agents and therefore the same absolute change translates into a bigger
percentage change based on a lower initial employment rate. On the other hand, a
higher initial unemployment rate implies a higher job separation rate in the calibration
which in turn leads to a higher responsiveness of N2 with respect to terms of trade
with country 1 and 3 on the simulated value range.15 For a very low initial U2 (and
high N2 respectively) the direct and indirect spillover effect are very small.
• Capital share α:
Differences in the capital share of income are a very crude but simple approach to
account for differences in production technologies between countries, which play an
important role for competitiveness. The higher the capital share in country 2, the
stronger is the response of employment to changes in the terms of trade on the simulated
interval from 20 to 40%. This results in an increase of the absolute as well as the relative
size of the spillover to employment as the indirect effect is with -0.7 per mill to 0.3
per mill negligible and the rise in N2,TOT 21 overturns the in α shrinking appreciation
of TOT 21 . Observe that α contemporaneously influences the relative country size: the
country size decreases in capital share of the country. Since the capital share of country
3 diminishes the appreciation of country 3 on the one hand, and increases ∆TOT 21 on
the other hand, by slightly increasing pi1 and pi2, it has a small positive impact on the
spillover size as well (see Figure 9). Overall, the changes in the absolute and relative
spillover size caused by the capital share of both countries are not very pronounced.
The relative spillover size ranges between 1.36% and 1.71%.
• Elasticity of vacancies in the matching function ψ:
A stronger impact on the relative strength of the spillover to employment is exercised
15Observe that a higher level of unemployment also implies a slightly smaller country size.
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by the elasticity of the matching function ψ. If ψ2 is well above the benchmark of 0.5,
the relative spillover size approaches 2%. For values below 0.3, the relative spillover
effect drops under 1%. Given the calibration, higher values of ψ on the value range
from 0.2 to 0.8 lead to an increase in the elasticity of employment with respect to the
terms of trade with both countries. Furthermore, for a given initial unemployment
rate, job finding and vacancy filling probability, higher values of ψ imply a higher
matching efficiency χ if the labour markets are not extremely tight, i.e. θ < 1. Thus,
the positive effect of ψ on the employment spillover is driven by an increasing direct
effect which is marginally dampened by a negative and in ψ falling indirect effect (see
Figure 10).
• Employees’ tax rate on wages τ d:
If the tax rate on wages paid by the employees in country 2 is higher at the time the
reform in country 1 occurs, the overall spillover effect is higher too. Since the level of τ d
is taken into consideration, when wages are bargained (see equation 25), it negatively
affects the calibration of the vacancy posting costs. Thus, a higher τ d leads to higher
elasticities of employment with respect to terms of trade which strengthen the direct
as well as the indirect spillover effect (see Figure 11). The direct spillover increases
from 1.45 to 1.80% of the domestic effect for a low tax rate of 1% to a very high tax
rate of 31% while the indirect effect is only slightly affected. In contrast to τ d, the tax
rate employers pay on wages τ f has no impact on spillover effects.
Unlike the country characteristics just discussed, the pre-reform steady state probability of
finding a job φ and the bargaining power of the firm  have quantitatively only a limited
influence on the size of employment spillovers. A higher job finding probability implies a
higher efficiency of matching χ in the model and thus decreases the vacancy posting cost of
firms. The productivity increase due to the reform can therefore be mapped more efficiently
into new jobs leading to an increase in foreign employment.16 This effect, however, is of
negligible magnitude even for a very high initial probability as reported in Table 2. Similarly,
strong changes in the level of 2 only have a small impact on the aggregated spillover effect,
with higher levels of 2 leading to a slightly higher impact of the reform on foreign employment
(see equation 32). The reason is that more of the reform induced productivity gain in country
2 is used to increase employment (in place of wages) if firms have a stronger standing in the
Nash bargaining.
To summarise the results for the non-trade related country characteristics, the indirect
effect is in most cases very small compared to the direct effect. It reaches 4% of the direct
16The result resembles a finding by Dao (2013a), that a higher degree of labour market rigidity in a foreign
country (introduced by assuming a lower initial job finding rate) leads to higher spillover effects.
25
effect for a high initial unemployment rate or a high capital share of country 2. Furthermore,
in most cases it opposes the direct effect in the sense that it assumes its lowest negative value
for a parametrisation where the direct effect is at its maximum and adds positively to the
direct effect when it is relatively low. This result implies that the aggregated spillover
effect, which is given by the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect, is positive in all
simulations which matches the result of empirical studies by Felbermayr et al. (2013) and
Dao (2013a).
The analysis has shown that country characteristics as the relative openness and bilateral
import preferences, the unemployment rate, the unemployment benefit ratio, the capital
share, the elasticity of matching and employee’s wage taxes have a non negligible effect on
the overall size of the spillover and its components. In particular, the more open a country
in general, especially versus the reforming country, and the stronger (weaker) the import
preferences of the reforming (third) country for intermediates from country 2, the stronger
is the spillover to employment there. Furthermore, countries having a high unemployment
benefit ratio, high unemployment rates, a relatively high capital share, elasticity of matching,
or employee’s wage tax rate benefit more from a labour market reform of their trading
partners in terms of an increase in employment.
In the preceding simulations, I started from a specific country scenario and varied one
parameter at a time. I found that the relative size of the aggregated spillover effect measured
as the ratio between the change of employment in the country of interest and the reforming
country ranges between 0 and close to 4% for calibrations in an empirically realistic range.
If I use the value from the tested (empirically plausible) range for which I obtained the
strongest overall spillover for all analysed parameters and initial conditions,17 the relative
size of the aggregated spillover is more than 11%. This value exceeds the average of 9%
estimated by Felbermayr et al. (2013). Thus, under certain conditions the model is able
to generate employment spillovers which reach the empirically found average. The driving
force of these high spillovers are, however, high direct effects, but not strong positive indirect
effects.
4 The German Hartz IV Reform and its Impact on
Different Neighbours
The three-country framework has an additional advantage over the two-country set-up: in
the latter, the trade balance and net foreign asset position of one country has always to
17I choose κ21 = 0.29, κ31 = 0.01, κ12 = 0.4, κ32 = 0.1, κ23 = κ13 = 0.05, U2 = 0.2, φ2 = 0.75, b2 = 0.4,
τd = 0.3, 2 = 0.8, ψ2 = 0.7 and α2 = 0.4.
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be a perfect mirror image of the second country as the country pair represents the world.
A three-country model breaks this strong link between the single countries since effects in
the first country do not necessarily trigger effects in the second country. It allows to map
bilateral and overall trade intensities at the same time as highlighted by Kose and Yi (2006),
and is thus the appropriate framework to assess the size of bilateral spillover effects. This
becomes evident in the following when presenting the model implications of the reform in
the unemployment benefit scheme for three scenarios taking differing German neighbours,
namely France, Belgium and Austria, as second country and assuming the third country to
be the rest of the euro area 12 (EA12) countries (RoEA in the following). Even though the
model is highly stylised, considerable differences between the single countries emerge. The
three scenarios demonstrate how strongly the model predicts spillovers to vary in the long as
well as in the short-run between heterogeneous countries in empirically relevant scenarios.
France, Belgium and Austria are assumed to differ with respect to their calibration of labour
market institutions and fiscal policy parameters as summarised in Table 3. While Belgium
and France are relatively similar in most aspects, Austria’s labour market situation differs
strongly with a lower unemployment rate, average unemployment duration and unemploy-
ment benefit ratio. With exception of the trade preferences, Germany is parameterised as
described in Subsection 2.7. The import preferences parameters for the different scenarios
are calibrated to correspond to the respective import shares given in Table 4. In contrast
to France, Austria and Belgium are very open countries with a home bias κii of only 0.74
and 0.52 respectively. Both have a high import share with respect to Germany, but while
Austria’s trade relationship is strongly focused on Germany, Belgium trades also heavily
with the RoEA. The country sizes implied by these import shares are close but not identical
to the countries’ GDP weights in the EA12.
The equilibrium effects of the reduction in the unemployment benefit ratio in Germany
for Germany and the respective second country are summarised in Table 5. In the long run,
the reaction of France resembles much that of the RoEA,18 whereas spillovers to Belgium and
Austria, depending on the outcome of interest, are two to three times the size of the RoEA
or France. With respect to employment, I find the spillover effect to the second country to
range between 0.3% and 0.8% of the original effect in Germany. France’s labour force is the
least affected, although its terms of trade change to the same extent as the Belgian.19 The
18The results for the three differing EA aggregates vary only slightly with the composition of the RoEA
and are very similar to the result for France. Therefore, I refrain from reporting them.
19Since labour market and fiscal institutions are very similar within these countries, the virtually identical
terms-of-trade effects point to the fact that the effects stemming from differences in import preferences cancel
out. In particular, the higher Belgian preference for German goods (κBG12 > κ
FR
12 ) and German preference for
French goods (κFR21 > κ
BG
21 ), which would both imply that the French terms-of-trade effect should be higher
according to the analysis above, counterbalance the higher Belgian preference for RoEA goods (κBG32 > κ
FR
32 )
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Table 3: Calibration of Heterogeneity in the Labour Market Institutions and Fiscal Policy
Country 2 Country 3
France Belgium Austria RoEA
1−N Unemployment rate 8.93 8.18 4.29 9.02 a
1/φ Av. duration of unemployment 15.50 16.57 b 3.88 c 16.57 b
φ Job finding probability 19.35 18.11 77.23 c 18.11
b/wh Unemployment benefit ratio 35.66 38.19 28.43 27.70 d
τ f Employers’ labour tax 29.00 23.00 23.00 23.75 d
τ d Employees’ labour tax 10.00 11.00 14.00 9.44 d
τ c Consumption tax 19.60 21.00 20.00 19.11 d
Notes: All numbers are in percentage points except the average duration of unemployment
which is given in months and refer to the year 2003 if not stated otherwise.
a EA average unemployment rate as published by the OECD including Germany.
b The Belgian as well as the EA average duration of unemployment are approximated by the
average duration of unemployment in the EU as published by the OECD owing to a lack of
more precise data.
c 2004 values.
d These rates are calculated as EA-12 averages excluding Germany using GDP weights at PPP
exchange rates of the corresponding year.
Sources: OECD Reference Series, INSEE, OECD Labour Market Statistics, OECD Benefits
and Wages: Statistics, OECD Taxing Wages 2003, OECD Recent Tax Policy Trends and
Reforms in OECD Countries 2004.
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Table 4: Bilateral Import Shares
From From
To Germany France RoEA To Germany Belgium RoEA
Germany 0.8777 0.0248 0.0975 Germany 0.8777 0.0175 0.1048
France 0.0450 0.8661 0.0888 Belgium 0.1359 0.5193 0.3448
RoEA 0.0615 0.0300 0.9086 RoEA 0.0521 0.0189 0.9290
From
To Germany Austria RoEA
Germany 0.8777 0.0121 0.1102
Austria 0.1798 0.7412 0.0790
RoEA 0.0510 0.0033 0.9457
Notes: RoEA refers to the EA12 excluding Germany and the respective second country. The
reported import shares are mean values over the period 1999-2012.
Sources: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank World Development Indicators.
lower responsiveness of employment in France is driven by its less intense trade relationship
with Germany relative to Belgium and Austria combined with its bigger country size which
implies a smaller relative change in the traded quantities. In Austria, the country specific
import preferences lead to a lower responsiveness of terms of trade in comparison to Belgium
which is mainly due to stronger preference for RoEA goods in Belgium. The relatively less
pronounced reaction of terms of trade due to the import preferences is partially countervailed
by a better labour market situation and lower unemployment benefits which induce ceteris
paribus a stronger increase in the terms of trade vis-a`-vis Belgium and France. Because of
its strong trade relation to Germany, which outstrips Belgium, and its very small country
size, Austria is subject to the strongest percentage changes in terms of output, consumption
and wages. Employment, on the contrary, is affected to a weaker extent than in Belgium
percentagewise since it improves from a very high pre-reform level (see Table 3). To give a
complete picture of the composition of the spillover effects, the elasticities of employment
with respect to the terms of trade calculated at the initial steady state are listed in the
lower part of Table 5. Multiplying these elasticities with the respective terms-of-trades
changes, reveals that the indirect effects, whether positive or negative, add less than 1%
to the direct effect. For France and Belgium we observe a small appreciation vis-a`-vis the
RoEA. Obviously the strong import preferences of Belgium for German as well as for RoEA
and RoEA preference for French goods (κFR23 > κ
BG
23 ), which in turn point to a higher terms-of-trade effect
in Belgium.
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Table 5: Percentage Change in Steady-State after a Reduction in b1
Country 1 Country 2
Germany France Belgium Austria
N 0.866 0.002 0.007 0.004
w -0.767 0.010 0.031 0.040
Y 0.839 0.012 0.037 0.043
C 0.293 0.032 0.096 0.118
TOT 21 0.431 0.431 0.423
TOT 23 0.001 0.001 -0.008
N2,TOT 21 0.005 0.016 0.009
N2,TOT 23 0.011 0.040 0.004
Note: All values in the upper part of the table measure the relative change from the pre-reform
steady state to the post-reform steady state. The elasticities in the lower part are calculated
at the initial steady state.
products yield a higher elasticity with respect to both terms of trade according to equation
(32). Thus, direct and indirect effect on employment are higher compared to France. The
tighter Austrian labour market leads to a lower responsiveness of employment to changes in
terms of trade there, even though κ12 is comparable between Austria and Belgium and κ32
between Austria and France. Interestingly, the indirect effect in Austria is negative, i.e. the
terms of trade between Germany and Austria are less affected by the reform than between
Germany and the RoEA. The negative effect stems from the relative large overall openness
of Austria (κ22 > κ33, compare Figure 2) and its strong focus on German imports (κ12 > κ32,
compare Figure 3) in contrast to France and Belgium. Thus, these import preferences imply
a depreciation versus the RoEA, but at the same time strong κ12 and low κ32 mean a higher
elasticity for the direct effect and a lower impact of the indirect effect.
The short-run response of selected variables is summarised in Figure 5. The first row
shows the adjustments of output, consumption and employment of country 1, i.e. Germany,
after a decline in its unemployment benefit ratio by 10 percentage points. Domestic employ-
ment and output rise monotonously whereas consumption initially drops due to a reduction
in household income and intertemporal preferences, recovering slowly afterwards as described
in Subsection 3.1. While the major adjustments in employment occur in the first two years,
consumption and output approach the new equilibrium much slower. The same outcomes of
country 2 are displayed in the second row of Figure 5 for the three scenarios where country
2 is calibrated to French, Belgian and Austrian data. The third row contains the impulse
responses of these countries’ terms of trade with Germany and with the RoEA and their net
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Note: All variables are expressed in percentage deviations from their pre-reform steady state
with the exception of net foreign assets (NFA) which are given as share of output.
Figure 5: Adjustments in Country 1 and 2 after a Reduction in b1
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foreign asset position as a share of their output. The reduction of unemployment benefits in
Germany induces its relative prices with its trading partners to shift. As plot (g) reveals, the
long-run appreciation of foreign terms of trade is preceded by a short initial depreciation.
This development causes an initial small drop in employment abroad (plot f). Since in the
first years after the reform the reaction of Austrian and Belgian terms of trade is stronger
than that of the RoEA, these countries appreciate vis-a`-vis the RoEA as displayed in plot
(h). In contrast to equilibrium, in the short run the third-country terms-of-trade effects are
sizeable, amounting to more than 10% of the direct terms-of-trade effect with Germany in
these two countries. Thus, they tend to dampen the negative effect on employment.20 For
France, being very similar to the RoEA, we observe only a minimal effect on its terms of
trade with the RoEA in the short run.
Thus, Austria as a very small country with a strong trade relationship to Germany is
initially hit strongest by the adverse effects and profits most in the long run, at least in
terms of output and consumption, by the German reforms. In addition, adjustments occur
faster in this country as its labour market is tight and unemployment benefits at a low level
compared to the other countries. This reflects also in the Austrian net foreign assets as share
of output which is initially higher than in the other countries but reverts also fast, especially
in comparison to France.
To wrap up, this section illustrated how differences in trade linkages as well as in insti-
tutions and initial situations among European countries lead to differences in the strength
and propagation of spillovers after the same reform.
5 Conclusion
In this study, I explored the size of spillover effects to employment in a foreign country
after a labour market reform in the domestic country. In contrast to previous studies,
which mainly focus on two-country scenarios, my analysis considers the presence of a third
(large) country. Thus, it explicitly includes indirect spillover effects caused by shifts in the
relation of the country of interest and a third country in addition to the direct spillover effect
stemming from shifts between the country of interest and the domestic country. In order
to assess the direction and strength of these spillover components, I conducted simulations
20In the short run, the impact of the adjustment in terms of trade on employment deviates from the
steady state approximation of equation (33). The deviations occur as, on the one hand, out of steady state
additional transmission effects arise from the international bond market and, on the other hand, the steady
state conditions used when calculating elasticities with respect to terms of trade do not necessarily hold
during the convergence process towards the new steady state which does not occur at the same speed for all
variables. The out-of-steady-state change in employment in the second country can therefore not simply be
decomposed in a direct and indirect effect stemming from the changes in terms of trade.
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based on a standard international RBC model with search and matching frictions in the
labour market expanded to include a third country. I found that the aggregated spillover
size measured relative to the effect in the domestic country may be sizeable. It reaches the
empirically estimated size documented by Felbermayr et al. (2012) of about one-tenth for
specific country characteristics. Variation in the size of the spillover effects stems, however,
mainly from changes in the size of the direct effect. The indirect effect turns out to be small
in all calibrations. Hence, neither does it strongly increase the direct effect nor overturn the
direct effect to yield a negative aggregated effect.
This result must be interpreted in the light of mechanisms included in the model. The
direct and indirect spillover effects in the model are based on shifts in terms of trade, thus
on competitiveness in terms of intermediate goods prices. The model does not capture
non-price competitiveness factors like product quality. These play an important role in
international competition as the study by Estrada et al. (2013) demonstrates and may,
therefore, be of relevance for the size of third-country effects. The model also abstracts
from shifts in import preferences which may be triggered by a reform. As the simulation
results of Subsection 3.3 have shown, these preferences have a big influence on the size of
spillover effects. Finally, in the discussion on third-country effects, differences in the sector
structure and specialisation between countries may also play a role for the size of direct
and indirect effects. I only consider differences in the capital share in the production as a
rough approximation. But these do not have major effects on the strength of direct and
indirect spillovers. An alternative approach to take structural differences into account is
an explicit modelling of a non-tradeable vs. tradeable sector as in Helpman and Itskhoki
(2010). Such an extended model could provide additional insights and would therefore be a
sensible extension of this study. Furthermore, medium to large-scale policy oriented models
such as the QUEST model by the European Commission (Ratto et al., 2009) or the EAGLE
model by the European Central Bank (Gomes et al., 2012) typically include three or more
countries and allow therefore for indirect spillover effects. It would be interesting to evaluate
the magnitude of the indirect effects in such models, as they are not explicitly discussed and
quantified in studies like Gomes et al. (2011) or Kollmann et al. (2014).
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A Country size
Taking the deterministic steady state of equations (9)-(11) and (27)-(29) and the condition
that the value of intermediate goods output equals the value of final goods output in each
country and combining them, the size of country 1 can be expressed as a function of relative
employment and import preferences:
pi1 =
(κ12κ23 + κ13(κ12 + κ32))
((1− κ11)(κ12 + κ32)− κ21κ12)N1N3 + (κ23(1− κ11) + κ21κ13)N1N2 + (κ12κ23 + κ13(κ12 + κ32))
This equation implies that the size of country 1 depends positively on foreign employment
N2, N3, its home bias κ11, and the import preferences of the other countries with respect to
the domestic good, κ12 and κ13. Domestic employment N1 and import preferences of country
1 for the intermediate goods of the other countries κ21 and κ31 have a negative impact on
pi1.
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Notes: The surface of this graph displays how the size of country 1 varies with its bilateral
import preferences. The scenarios deviate from the baseline calibration only for the openness
preferences of country 1. The figure implicitly contains the overall preference towards openness
which is given by the sum of κ21 and κ31. For symmetric preferences for goods of country 2
and 3, the overall preference towards openness is given by the diagonal from north to south.
The stronger the preference, the smaller the country. The same applies to the individual
preferences. The red horizontal diagonal (which lies in the surface) displays all scenarios where
1− κ11 = 0.3 as in the baseline calibration, which implies that the size of country 1 pi1 = 1/3,
although import preferences of country 1 do not have to be symmetric. Asymmetries in bilateral
import preferences in turn influence the size of the trade partners. The black line represents
the size of country 2 pi2 for κ11 = κ22 = κ33 = 0.3. The stronger the preference of country 1
for goods from country 2 relative to country 3, all other bilateral preferences being symmetric,
the bigger country 2 relative to country 3.
Figure 6: Relation between Country Size and Openness Preferences
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B Graphical Appendix
Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3, 1−κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1−κ33)/2 and 1−κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , increase in b2/w2.
Figure 7: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying b2/w2 and
b3/w3
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Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3, 1−κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1−κ33)/2 and 1−κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , increase in U2.
Figure 8: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying U2 and U3
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Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3, 1−κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1−κ33)/2 and 1−κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , increase with growing α2.
Figure 9: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying α2 and α3
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Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3, 1−κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1−κ33)/2 and 1−κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , increase with growing ψ2.
Figure 10: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying ψ2 and ψ3
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Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3, 1−κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1−κ33)/2 and 1−κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , increase with growing τd2 .
Figure 11: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying τ d2 and τ
d
3
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Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3, 1−κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1−κ33)/2 and 1−κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , fall with growing φ2.
Figure 12: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying φ2 and φ3
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Notes: In this scenario 1−κ11 = 0.3, 1−κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1−κ33)/2 and 1−κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities, N2,TOT 21 and N2,TOT 23 , increase with growing 2.
Figure 13: Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying 2 and 3
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C Derivation
In this appendix I derive the elasticity of employment in country 2 with respect to its terms
of trade with country j N2,TOT 2j and show that it has to be positive. Consider the steady
state of the model, where steady state values are expressed as variables without time index.
Combining the optimality conditions for vacancy posting and from the wage bargaining,
equations (20) and (25), and using the following expression for the capital labour ratio
K2
N2
=
(
P2
P c2
α
1/β−1+δ
)
derived from optimal bond demand (equation 19), we obtain:
(1− β (1− s2))
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2 =
=

ω2
(P2
P c2
) 1
1−α
(1− α)
(
α
1
β
− 1 + δ
) α
1−α
− 1 + τ
f
2
1− τ d2
b2
 . (34)
Furthermore, with the help of equation (12), we can express the inverse of the final good
price in terms of the intermediate good of country 2 as a function of its terms of trade with
its neighbours:
P2
P c2
=
[
κ12TOT
2 η−1
1 + κ22 + κ32TOT
2 η−1
3
] 1
η−1 .
Thus, the marginal effects of a change in terms of trade on prices in country 2 in the steady
state, where TOT 21 = TOT
2
3 = 1, are given by κ12 and κ32 for country 1 and 3, respectively.
Based on this knowledge, I apply the implicit function theorem to equation (34) to derive
the elasticity of labour market tightness in country 2 with respect to its terms of trade with
country 1:
θ2,TOT 21 =
δθ2
δTOT 21
1
θ2
=

ω2
κ12
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
> 0, (35)
which is always positive for , ω2,, κ12, h2, δ, α, χ2, θ2 > 0, 0 < β < 1, 0 < s2 < 1, 0 < ψ < 1.
The elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to the terms of trade with country 3
are given by a very similar expression, the only difference being the preference for imports
from country 3, κ32:
θ2,TOT 23 =

ω2
κ32
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
> 0. (36)
One can then use the relation between employment N and labour market tightness θ,
given by s2N2 = q2V2 = H2 = χ2θ
ψ
2 (1−N2), to derive
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δN2
δθ2
=
s2ψχ2θ
ψ−1
2(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
)2 > 0. (37)
Finally, by combining equation (35) or (36) with (37), we can write the elasticity of
employment with respect to the terms of trade of any trading partner j as:
N2,TOT 2j =
δN2
δθ2
δθ2
δTOT 2j
1
N2
=
s2ψ(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
)θ2,TOT 2j ,
such that
N2,TOT 2j =
κj2
ω2
s2ψ(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
) 
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
[
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
] > 0. (38)
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